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ABSTRACT 
The Texas A&M Forest Service (TFS) led the firefighting efforts during the most 
catastrophic wildfire season in Texas history. The 2011 wildfire season caused massive 
losses statewide including four million acres burned and over 2,900 homes destroyed. 
TFS leaders who were responsible for managing and fighting these fires have valuable 
insights about how decisions were made during the 2011 wildfire season. These insights 
provided valuable information that can further the research paradigm of Naturalistic 
Decision Making and Macrocognition. Additionally, these insights provided reflective 
observations that TFS leaders can reference in order to continually improve in making 
effective decisions during crisis situations. 
The purpose of this study was to understand how TFS leaders made decisions 
during the 2011 wildfire season. I used a qualitative approach to address the purpose of 
this study and understand factors that influenced how seven TFS leaders made decisions 
in 2011. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the participants of this study. 
Additionally, several documents were obtained from the TFS to provide further 
information about how decisions were made in 2011. A number of factors were 
identified to have an influence on TFS leaders’ decision making. It was found that TFS 
culture was a component that influenced decision making along with consideration of 
TFS’s reputation and the safety of firefighters and people of Texas. Additionally, it was 
found that TFS leaders had to constantly account for the fire environment, manage the 
distribution of resources, and communicate effectively amongst themselves, interagency 
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firefighters, and the public of Texas. Lessons learned was the last component TFS 
leaders discussed as part of the decisions they made in 2011. 
From the findings of this study, it was understood that the TFS leaders handled 
the 2011 wildfire season as effectively as possible considering the harsh implications of 
the wildfires they addressed. TFS leaders were responsible, conscientious, and caring to 
the people of Texas. I made several recommendations for future research in addition to 
some recommendations for changes TFS leaders may want to consider based on the 
findings from this study. This study was meant to provide a reference for TFS leaders to 
use so they could have a more complete understanding of factors, implications, 
strengths, and areas for improvement regarding decisions they made during the 2011 
wildfire season. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
W. Goodrich Jones and several other conservation-minded leaders in Temple, 
Texas formed the Texas Forestry Association in 1914. At the time, the primary purpose 
of the Texas Forestry Association was to “form a state forestry agency and develop a 
statewide plan for forest conservation” (Texas A&M Forest Service, 2015a, para. 6). The 
Texas Forestry Association’s purpose was accomplished in 1915 as the House Bill No. 
9, “An Act to Promote Forest Interests in the State” provided the platform for the TFS to 
be created (Texas A&M Forest Service, 2015a, para. 7). When it was created by the 
Texas Legislature on March 31, 1915, it was originally called the Department of 
Forestry. In 1926, it was renamed the Texas Forest Service. In 2010 it was finally 
renamed the Texas A&M Forest Service (TFS) (Texas A&M Forest Service, 2015a).  
The TFS responsibilities have grown over time. The 34th Texas Legislature 
delegated the responsibility to the TFS of creating a system to protect and preserve the 
Texas forests and also declare a state of emergency should one arise (Gammel, 1917, p. 
220). Now the mission of the TFS can be boiled down to its three core values: Lead, 
Protect, and Conserve. These are reflected in the opening sentence of the TFS mission 
statement: “Texas A&M Forest Service provides statewide leadership to assure the 
state’s trees, forests and related natural resources are protected and sustained for the 
benefit of all” (Texas A&M Forest Service, 2015b, para. 1). The TFS has been providing 
this service for 100 years, and it has protected Texans from the destruction of numerous 
wildfires. However, wildfires are a devastating force of nature that cannot always be 
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contained or controlled. In 2011, the wildfire conditions in Texas were, historically, the 
worst this state has ever experienced (Texas A&M Forest Service, 2015).  
The exceptional wildfire conditions were due, in large part, to the drought 
beginning in October 2010, which lasted through September 2011 and was one of the 
driest yearlong periods in the history of Texas (Nielsen-Gammon, 2012). The drought 
was also considered the most costly drought in history as it cost a record of $7.62 billion 
(Fannin, 2012). However, the drought was not the only contributing factor that provoked 
the widespread devastation left in the wake of more than 31,000 wildfires that burned in 
Texas during 2011. In 2010, there were significant weather conditions that set the stage 
for massive fuel (grass and small brush) growth, which prompted the 2011 wildfires to 
burn with such ferocity. The fuel growth was caused by major rainfall from four tropical 
systems that led to rapid grass growth in the summer of 2010. In the winter of 2010, the 
grass and brush that grew earlier that summer dried out and froze. The freeze turned the 
brush into an excellent source of kindling (Jones, Saginor, & Smith, 2012). The 
infamous 2011 drought began in September 2010 when the last of the four storm 
systems, which brought a heavy amount of rainfall, left the state of Texas (Fannin, 
2012). After this occurred, the drought conditions in Texas worsened and there were 
several record, high-temperature months along with a record, dry month (March, 2011) 
(Fannin, 2012). 
In 2011, as the drought conditions worsened, the probability for highly-
destructive wildfires became more likely. Not surprisingly, 2011 witnessed some of the 
most catastrophic wildfires in Texas history. According to the data Fannin (2012) 
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obtained from the TFS, the first out of the 20 largest (acres burned) fires in 2011 was the 
Matador West Fire that began on February 27 and burned 41,000 acres including two 
homes. Some of the other major fires that year included the Swenson Fire that burned 
122,500 acres and two homes; the Possum Kingdom Complex that burned 126,734 acres 
and 168 homes, the Rockhouse Fire that burned 314,444 acres and 23 homes; and the 
most destructive wildfire in Texas history, the Bastrop County Complex, which resulted 
in 2 fatalities, 1,660 homes, 36 commercial buildings, and 34,068 acres burned (Fannin, 
2012; Jones et al., 2012). As a whole, there were 31,453 fires that burned 2,947 homes 
and four million acres in 2011 (Jones et al., 2012).  
Catastrophic events like the 2011 wildfire can teach valuable lessons about how 
to respond to similar situations in the future. This study explored how leaders of the TFS 
made decisions during the 2011 wildfire season. Consequently, the results of this study 
could be a valuable reference for TFS leaders when future wildfires occur, similar to the 
ones in 2011. 
Problem Statement 
 The 2011 wildfire season was the most catastrophic fire season that Texas has on 
record. It required over 16,000 firefighters to come to Texas from all regions and 
territories of the United States. Previous studies have shown the causes of the 2011 
wildfires, and how citizens can help mitigate or prevent fires from burning their homes 
and property in the future. However, I was not aware of any study that has been done to 
describe how TFS leaders, who were responsible for leading the firefighting efforts in 
2011, made decisions. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to describe how leaders of the TFS made decisions 
during the 2011 wildfire season. This study can be referenced as a resource for TFS 
leaders in the future who are faced with similar situations. This study addressed one 
research question: How did leaders of the Texas A&M Forest Service make decisions 
during the 2011 wildfire season?  
Definition of Terms and Concepts 
Wildfire – “An unplanned, unwanted wildland fire including unauthorized human-caused 
fires, escaped wildland fire use events, escaped prescribed fire projects, and all other 
wildland fires where the objective is to put the fire out” (National Wildfire Coordinating 
Group, 2014, p. 185). 
Scope – Operationally defined as the size and time risks associated with a fire. For 
example: high fire risk is present statewide for an extended period of time (SD3). 
Operational Tempo – “The speed and intensity of actions relative to the speed and 
intensity of the unfolding events in the operational environment” (National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group, 2014, p. 130). 
Complexity – Operationally defined as factors that increase the likelihood of a complex 
fire including: dry fuels, extended drought, fire weather (e.g. wind and no rain), and 
wildland urban interface (SD3). 
Project Fire – Operationally defined as a fire that is out of control and usually massive 
in size requiring multiple types of resources to contain. 
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Incident Management Team (IMT) - “The purpose of an IMT is to organize and manage 
the response to an incident or to support a portion of the incident response.” (SD4, p. 5). 
Wildland Urban Interface – “Line, area, or zone where structures and other human 
development meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels. 
Describes an area within or adjacent to private and public property where mitigation 
actions can prevent damage or loss from wildfire” (National Wildfire Coordinating 
Group, 2014, p. 187). 
Assumptions 
There are several assumptions under which this study operated, including but not 
limited to the following: 
1. The TFS leaders who were interviewed were honest in their answers to the 
questions that were asked of them. 
2. The historical information provided by the TFS leaders regarding the 2011 
wildfire season is accurate and true based on documentation and personal 
accounts. 
3. The TFS leaders recounted their experiences from the 2011 wildfire season 
reasonably to the best of their ability. 
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Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The scope of this study included seven high-level TFS leaders. I asked these TFS 
leaders to discuss specific, self-identified decisions they made during the 2011 wildfire 
season. A limitation of this study is that it only considered how decisions were made 
from the TFS leaders’ perspectives who participated in this study. This study was not a 
holistic account of how decisions were made during the 2011 wildfire season. 
Additionally, because several years have passed since the 2011 wildfire season, several 
TFS leaders who were interviewed stated their memories were somewhat foggy about 
certain events that occurred.  
Significance of the Study  
This study sought to inform how TFS leaders made decisions during the most 
catastrophic wildfire season in the history of Texas. The TFS has a mission statement 
based on several core values “We have a call to serve, a duty to protect, and a 
commitment to support; and we believe in the power of partnership” (Texas A&M 
Forest Service, 2015, para. 1). In order for the TFS to continue to operate and achieve its 
mission, it is important TFS leaders understand how their decisions impact this mission. 
Consequently, the findings from this study can be used as a tool for TFS leaders to 
reference in the future when situations arise similar to the 2011 wildfire season. 
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CHAPTER II  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This study sought to understand how TFS leaders made decisions during the 
2011 wildfire season. The TFS is a public-service organization that operates much 
differently from a private sector company. They exist to serve the people of Texas 
(Texas A&M Forest Service, 2015). According to Coombs (2014), disasters are great in 
scale and they require multiple governmental units to address.  In 2011, the wildfires 
created a disaster that cost Texas citizens’ lives, property, and homes.  
There are several concepts from previous literature that served as a framework to 
guide this study. The concepts included: Crisis Management, Communication, and 
Leadership; Learning Organizations; and High Reliability Organizations; and 
Macrocognition. Lastly, I discussed the Naturalistic Decision Making paradigm, as this 
was the context that primarily guided this study.  
Crisis Management, Communication, and Leadership 
 A number of studies have been performed about managing crises in organizations 
(Boin & Hart, 2003; Coombs, 2014; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Pearson & Clair, 1998). 
Coombs (2007a) identified a crisis as “a significant threat to operations that can have 
negative consequences if not handled properly” (p. 1). Key threats a crisis imposes on an 
organization are (1) harm to the public, (2) loss of financial resources, and (3) damage to 
reputation (Coombs, 2007a). Several elements of dealing with crisis include: 
management of the actual events (crisis management) that occur during the crisis 
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(Pearson & Clair, 1998), communicating during a crisis (Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005), 
and leading during a crisis (James & Wooten, 2005).  
Crisis Management and Communication 
 There are multiple types of crises that organizations deal with as Hutchins and 
Wang (2008) outlined in their study of organizational crisis management and human 
resource development. Types of crises, to name a few, include: corporate scandals, 
disease, explosions, and natural disaster (Hutchins & Wang, 2008; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 
2003). No matter the type, “crisis management is a critical organizational function” 
(Coombs, 2007a, p. 1). Coombs (2007a) argued that a crisis must be dealt with based on 
the three threats previously mentioned. Public safety should always be the first priority 
in a crisis situation followed by reputational and financial concerns. Communication is a 
key element that affects public perception during a crisis situation (Coombs, 2007b). 
Communication can alter the public’s view of the reputation of an organization 
positively or negatively during a crisis. “Crisis response strategies are the organization’s 
answer” (Coombs, 2007b, p. 170). If an organization can effectively mitigate the damage 
a crisis causes to the public and itself, the organization is likely to emerge stronger than 
it was before the crisis (Coombs, 2007a).  
Crisis Leadership 
 James and Wooten (2005) stated that dealing with a crisis involves more than just 
effective management and communication. They agreed that management and 
communication are two important elements of dealing with a crisis; however, they also 
identified another factor, leadership, which they believed was even more important than 
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management and communication. They argued that effective leadership is a key factor of 
moving an organization past a crisis situation. Dealing with a crisis is not a linear 
process; it is a dynamic and constantly changing process, which involves strong 
leadership that can analyze difficult situations and the associated consequences (Boin & 
Hart, 2003; James & Wooten, 2005; Walsh, 1995; Weick, 1988; Wooten & James, 
2008). One of the most important attributes of crisis leadership is trustworthiness (James 
& Wooten, 2005). “Without trust, organizational decision-making and strategy 
implementation are doomed to fail…. To build trust, leaders need to communicate 
openly, honestly, and often” (James & Wooten, 2005, p. 146). Effective crisis leaders 
also rely on employees (or experts) with a specific knowledge base or experiences to 
glean information when making decisions. However, the leader, not the expert, must 
ultimately make the decisions, because the leader is often best positioned to do so as 
he/she has the “broadest perspective on the organization” (James & Wooten, 2005, p. 
148). Another attribute of savvy leadership during a crisis is the recognition of the 
learning opportunity a crisis presents. However, in order to do this, the leaders, along 
with his/her organizations, must have a learning mentality (Hutchins & Wang, 2008; 
James & Wooten, 2005). Boin and Hart (2003) discussed (post-crisis) learning as “a 
matter of designing unheroic technological improvements and adapting bureaucratic 
routines. This requires patience, institutional memory, and a low-conflict atmosphere” 
(p. 548). Kotter (2012) posited that leaders should also practice reflecting on their 
experiences in order to learn from them. By reflecting on their experiences, leaders can 
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learn from their successes and mistakes in order to improve their performance in the 
future. 
Learning Organizations 
There is not a formal definition of a learning organization, because a learning 
organization could have different meanings to different people and organizations (Senge, 
2014). Senge (2006) posited that a learning organization cannot even physically exist as 
it is more of a guiding ideology that organizations should continually strive to 
experience. Elements that have been associated with a learning organization include: 
 People feel free to express their own opinions and biases. 
 There is a sense of equality among people. A mutual respect among 
colleagues. 
 People feel free to make mistakes, take risks, and assess results openly 
with others. 
 People feel a deeper meaning to the work they do. There is a sense of 
purpose in the work they do. 
 Employees are encouraged to learn the inner workings of their 
organization holistically so they are able to see how their actions affect it 
(Senge, 2014). 
Organizations can only learn if the individuals that work within them are devoted 
to learning for themselves (Senge, 2006). Individual learning does not guarantee 
organizational learning, but organizational learning cannot occur without individual 
learning. Elements or “disciplines” that comprise a learning organization are systems 
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thinking, personal mastery, building a shared vision, team learning, and mental models 
(Senge, 2006). People with a high level of personal mastery contain several 
characteristics including “a special sense of purpose behind their visions and goals” and 
they “live in a continual learning mode” (Senge, 2006, p. 132). These characteristics 
allow individuals to inject their personal beliefs, values, and purpose into the work they 
do within their organization. 
While personal mastery is a key to understanding vision, purpose, and continual 
learning, it is not the only component necessary within a learning organization. In 
addition to personal mastery, there are three other core disciplines of a learning 
organization: shared vision, team learning, and mental models (Senge, 2006). Shared 
vision is a core component, because it is the link for the personal visions of those in an 
organization. This is a vital component as it allows individuals to work together toward a 
common goal. Likewise, team learning is the link between individual learning and 
organizational learning. It brings together the personal visions and organizational shared 
vision, and focuses them into a collective effort to learn communally through the sharing 
of individual experiences. Lastly, mental models are the ingrained assumptions that 
individuals hold for how the world operates. The ability to reflect upon and test 
individual mental models and practices within an organization is another component 
vital to a learning organization. Senge (2006) recognized that individual mental models 
can be flawed. “Understanding these flaws can help to see where prevailing mental 
models will be weakest and where more than just ‘surfacing’ managers’ mental models 
will be required for effective decisions” (Senge, 2006, p. 189). Mental models must be 
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challenged to determine their validity in making decisions and determining the strategy 
of an organization.   
Senge (2006) further discussed how systems thinking could allow people to solve 
problems; “Often we are puzzled by the causes of our problems; when we merely need 
to look at our own solutions to other problems in the past” (p. 57). This example from 
Senge (2006) referred to how individuals and organizations learn by looking at their 
pasts; solutions are realized through individual learning and effective decision making. 
One type of organization that consistently learns and adapts is a high reliability 
organization (HRO) (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). 
High Reliability Organizations 
There may not be a formal definition for HROs, however, an acceptable 
description of them is that they are “adaptive organizational forms for an increasingly 
complex environment” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008, p. 31). HROs are 
characterized by five key factors: “Preoccupation with failure,” a “reluctance to simplify 
interpretations,” a “sensitivity to operations,” a “commitment to resilience,” and an 
“underspecification of structures” (Weick et. al., 2008, p. 31). 
Preoccupation with Failure 
 A distinctive quality about HROs is their constant preoccupation with failure 
(Weick et. al., 2008). Sitkin (1992) outlined that learning in an organization occurs 
through failure. From that perspective, safe HROs would not be able to learn very 
effectively. Therefore, to be effective, HROs must learn in at least three ways including: 
analyzing near failures, concentrating on the liabilities of success, and treating any 
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failures they do experience as windows of opportunity to improve the strength of their 
systems (Weick et al., 2008). 
Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations 
 Simplifying complex issues and problems is a welcome skill in most 
organizations, except for HROs. These simplifications or justifications allow members 
of the organization to ignore certain data and information if it is too complex or does not 
make sense (Weick et al., 2008). However, simplifications also allow uncertainty and 
misunderstanding to accumulate over time, which could lead to serious consequences for 
an HRO. HROs are different in that they train people not to simplify, but rather, pay 
attention to anomaly and notice bits of information that could lead to serious 
consequences if dealt with ineffectively or not at all (Roth, 1997; Weick et al., 2008; 
Xiao, Milgram, & Doyle, 1997). 
Sensitivity to Operations 
 Sensitivity to operations has also been termed as “having the bubble,” which is a 
term that has been borrowed from the U.S. Navy that basically means having an overall 
cognitive map that integrates meaning from a number of different inputs (Roberts & 
Rousseau, 1989, p. 132). Sensitivity to operations is an integrated view of the 
complexities in a given situation (Weick et al., 2008). 
Commitment to Resilience 
 Not all HROs have a protocol that helps them handle problems effectively. There 
are many instances where members of HROs must deal with unexpected situations in 
quick and pressure-filled environments (Weick et al., 2008). Commitment to resilience 
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means that HROs must deal with fluctuating and uncertain environments in order to 
successfully prevent, mitigate, or cope with failure (Weick et al., 2008). 
Underspecification of Structures 
 Effective HROs pay less attention to hierarchical structure and more attention to 
problems they must address. In other words, top leaders of an effective HRO are not 
always the ones to make decisions. Rather, decisions are allowed to be made by those 
who are closer to or have experience dealing with a specific problem at hand (Weick et 
al., 2008). “What is distinctive about effective HROs is that they loosen the designation 
of who is the ‘important’ decision maker in order to allow decision making to migrate 
along with problems” (Weick et al., 2008, p. 49).  
HROs do not operate the same as typical corporations or organizations, because 
they are not focused primarily on efficiency or profitability. Rather, the issues they deal 
with are reliability of their operations (Weick, 1987; Weick et. el., 2008). Weick et al. 
(2008) stated, “for a system to remain reliable, it must somehow handle unforeseen 
situations in ways that forestall unintended consequences” (p. 35). HROs place more 
emphasis on not failing than they do on being successful. Additionally, effective HROs 
that experience failure infrequently must learn from the failures of other organizations, 
as they do not have the luxury to learn from their own mistakes (Weick et al., 2008). 
Two examples of HROs include: the Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic 
Control Centers, and the U.S. Navy (Roberts, 1990). A failure by either of these 
organizations will most likely produce catastrophic results that could easily include loss 
of multiple lives. For example, if a plane crashed into another plane (due to a poor 
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decision by the air traffic controller), or if a target was inadvertently destroyed by a navy 
ship (because of a poor decision made by a navy officer), many lives would be lost.  
The people within HROs do not seek to simplify a situation for the sake of time. 
Their commitment to resilience allows them to work towards a solution that has been 
thoroughly analyzed. People within effective HROs challenge mental models as a 
necessary part of their existence. They cannot afford to think homogenously, because 
they have to recognize different threats and opportunities for failure. Weick (1987) 
summarized that teams in effective HROs have a diversity of individuals, which means 
they observe different things about a problem and can collectively see more than any one 
of them could see individually. On the other hand, homogenous teams do not have this 
diversity of thought, and are not able to handle problems effectively in the way that 
diverse teams can. The HROs’ strength comes from their diversity of thought. This 
divergence of thought is exactly what HROs need because it “holds the key to detecting 
anomalies” (Weick et al., 2008, p. 42). However, HROs realize that error is inevitable, 
because humans are fallible, which means consequently, that the technology they create 
and use is also fallible (Vaughan, 1997; Weick et al., 2008). One source of error 
Quarantelli (1988) discussed was personnel burnout, where leaders work too long at one 
time and their decision making effectiveness is threatened due to fatigue. Additionally, if 
leaders are not able to make decisions effectively and efficiently, then the “capability of 
the organization can be seriously impaired” ( Quarantelli, 1988, p. 380). 
 In light of this, HROs must make decisions that minimize and mitigate the 
potential for error. However, decisions that HROs make often have high risk of failure 
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with devastating consequences. This high risk of failure makes accuracy of decision 
making vital in order to avoid a catastrophe, and as expected, decision-makers in this 
context are held principally responsible for their decisions (Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 
1994). Because most HROs primarily exist as a public service (LaPorte & Consolini, 
1991), safety is the most important concern that decision makers of HROs must address 
(Bourrier, 1996). This is because reliability, rather than efficiency, is the utmost priority 
of an HRO. Additionally, Bourrier (1996) found that “the most important characteristic 
is the formal delegation of power to craft personnel, supported by a nearly complete 
availability of top-management at all times. By being a very flexible and adaptive 
organization, any problem can rapidly receive the attention it requires …” (p. 109). This 
formal delegation is how HROs are able to make decisions based on experience rather 
than rank in the organization. As Bourrier (1996) posited, the delegation of decision 
making to people within the HRO that have specific expertise relating to the problem(s) 
at hand, allows those problems to be addressed by the most qualified (experientially) 
individuals. However, even with qualified people making decisions, errors still occur, 
and unfortunately, even failure. 
 It was a result of a HRO failure in 1988 that led to the birth of a new field of 
research in decision making.  
The most advanced type of US Navy cruiser, the USS Vincennes, equipped with 
the state-of-the-art AEGIS tracking system, on a clear day, with hardly any other 
aircraft in the sky, mistakenly shot down an Iranian Airbus A300 airliner, killing 
all 290 passengers and crew members. The decision-makers on board the 
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Vincennes had believed that the ship was being attacked by the Airbus, which 
they mistook for an F-14 despite clear evidence to the contrary. (Klein, 2015, p. 
382) 
Because of this incredible failure, a need arose to better understand how decisions were 
made under “time pressure and uncertainty” (Klein, 2015, p. 383). Klein (2015) noted 
that skilled decision makers can handle time pressure and uncertainty. However, there 
was not any research, outside of a laboratory setting, that indicated how decision makers 
made decisions, nor how their decision making could be practically improved (Klein, 
2015). It was assumptions such as this that led to the discovery of the Naturalistic 
Decision Making (NDM) paradigm. However, first Macrocognition must be explained, 
as it is the broader framework in which NDM now resides. 
Macrocognition 
NDM research involves complex, “real world” studies, and it primarily draws 
upon real-life situations to inform it. “The mission of NDM – to understand how people 
make decisions under difficult conditions, and how to help them do a better job” 
(Schraagen, Militello, Ormerod, & Lipshitz, 2008, p. 6). Since NDM’s inception, the 
paradigm has expanded its mission to include, “understanding how people handle 
difficult cognitive demands of their work, and trying to help them do a better job” 
(Schraagen et al., 2008, p. 6). It was further argued that solely focusing on decision 
making did not include the extent of the phenomena being studied (Schraagen et al., 
2008). Klein et al., (2003) discussed Macrocognition as a more holistic approach to 
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understanding naturalistic decision making as part of overall cognition in a naturalistic 
context. Primary tenants of Macrocognition include: 
• Decisions are typically complex, often involving data overload. 
• Decisions are often made under time pressure and involve high stakes and 
high risk.  
• Research participants are domain practitioners rather than college students.  
• Goals are sometimes ill-defined, and multiple goals often conflict.  
• Decisions must be made under conditions in which few things can be 
controlled or manipulated; indeed, many key variables and their interactions 
are not even fully understood. (Klein et al., 2003, p. 81) 
Schraagen et al. (2008) defined Macrocognition as “the study of cognitive adaptations to 
complexity” (p. 9). They further explained Macrocognition as the “study of cognitive 
phenomena found in natural settings, especially (but not limited to) cognitive work 
conducted in complex sociotechnical contexts” (p.8).  
The field of Macrocognition seeks to understand how people think in real-world 
settings. “By gaining a better understanding of macrocognitive functions we can provide 
an alternative to the conventional approaches to design and training and better support 
the needs of the practitioners – the people taking actions” (Schraagen et al., 2008, p. 15). 
Macrocognition retains primary tenants of NDM, but seeks to more holistically describe 
cognitive phenomena. Macrocognition involves a series of functions and processes that 
people perform in light of the eight features of NDM (Schraagen et al., 2008). Before 
these eight features are described, the origins of NDM must be understood.    
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Naturalistic Decision Making 
 In 1989 over 30 researchers met during a critical event to help understand “how 
people actually made decisions” following the USS Vincennes disaster (Klein, 2015, p. 
383). The result of this meeting was a thorough explanation of NDM theory and its 
tenants (Klein, 1993). This was a collective effort of the professionals that met in 1989, 
and combined, they described the phenomenon now known as NDM.  
 “Naturalistic decision making is all about how experts make decisions in the real 
world” (Schraagen et al., 2008, p. xxv). There are eight characteristics of decision 
making that emerged to inform the NDM paradigm: 
1. Ill-structured problems (not artificial, well-structured problems). 
2. Uncertain, dynamic environments (not static, simulated situations). 
3. Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals (not clear and stable goals). 
4. Action/feedback loops (not one-shot decisions). 
5. Time stress  (as opposed to ample time for tasks). 
6. High stakes (not situations devoid of true consequences for the decision 
maker). 
7. Multiple players (as opposed to individual decision making). 
8. Organizational goals and norms (as opposed to decision making in a 
vacuum). (Zsambok & Klein, 1997, p. 5.) 
From these key markers, a definition of NDM evolved: 
The study of NDM asks how experienced people, working as individuals or 
groups in dynamic, uncertain, and often fast-paced environments, identify and 
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assess their situation, make decisions and take actions whose consequences are 
meaningful to them and to the larger organization in which they operate. 
(Zsambok & Klein, 1997, p. 5) 
Rasmussen (1993) stated that practical or natural decision making involves making 
multiple decisions in a constantly changing environment rather than resolving a series of 
separate conflicts. Rasmussen (1993) looked at previously completed studies that 
illustrated this concept in actual work contexts including: The U.S Navy, medical 
doctors, and stock brokers. The main point was that experimental design studies about 
decision making do not adequately describe how decisions are made. “Experimental 
design suggests that decision makers are subject to an information input that they have to 
process. The task is isolated from its normal context, and, therefore, the ‘tacit 
knowledge’ of the subject has no opportunity to be ‘synchronized’” (Rasmussen, 1993, 
p.161). Rasmussen (1993) further noted that subjects who have to make decisions in an 
actual work setting are forced to consider the context of where they are instead of 
isolating and addressing an individual task.  
Schraagen et al. (2008) stated, “In gathering data, the field of 
NDM/Macrocognition is guided by curiosity about how experts are able to notice things 
that others cannot, and how experts are able to make decisions that would confound 
people with less experience” (p. 16). The primary goal of this study was to further 
inform the field of NDM/Macrocognition through a qualitative study of how TFS leaders 
made decisions during the 2011 wildfire season. 
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CHAPTER III  
METHODS 
 The purpose of this study was to describe how TFS leaders made decisions 
during the 2011 wildfire season. I sought to understand how the phenomenon of the 
2011 wildfire season held meaning for TFS leaders involved in making decisions. As 
this aligns with key characteristics of a basic qualitative approach, I chose to use this 
approach for this study. These key characteristics included: a desire to understand how 
people make meaning of their experiences, how people construct their environments in 
which they work and live, and how people make meaning of their experiences. 
(Merriam, 2009). Because this study addressed how the TFS leaders made decisions in 
2011 it was “anchored in real-life situations,” which was another reason why I selected a 
qualitative approach (Merriam, 2009, p. 51). Additionally, this study offered “insights” 
and it “illuminates meanings that expand its readers’ experiences” that related to the 
2011, Texas wildfire season (Merriam, 2009, p. 51). Affecting or improving practice is 
another reason for conducting a qualitative study (Merriam, 2009). This study sought to 
gain an understanding of how TFS leaders made decisions to hopefully affect and 
improve their ability to make decisions in the future.  I gathered data through semi-
structured interviews as well as document and archival record analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). 
 This study relied upon multiple sources of evidence to address the previously 
stated research question: How did leaders of the Texas A&M Forest Service make 
decisions during the 2011 wildfire season? These multiple sources of evidence 
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developed “converging lines of inquiry,” which were necessary for the triangulation of 
the data (Yin, 2009, p. 115). Triangulation of data is a critical component of qualitative 
research. Effort was made to corroborate single sources of data against other sources, as 
“no single item of information should ever be given serious consideration unless it can 
be triangulated” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 283). Interviews were the primary source of 
data collected for this study as they were necessary to seek information about past events 
that cannot be replicated (Merriam, 2009). 
Sample Selection 
I selected a unique sample of individuals from the TFS. “A unique sample is 
based on unique, atypical, perhaps rare attributes or occurrences of the phenomenon of 
interest” (Merriam, 2009, p. 78). The population pool for this study included individuals 
who held department head (or higher) positions in the TFS [Name] branch. I chose 
participants for this study using criterion-based sampling. A key informant (gatekeeper), 
who was an executive leader in the TFS and a participant in this study, identified leaders 
who were responsible for decisions made during the 2011 wildfire season. Additionally, 
these participants were chosen, because they were primarily responsible for leading the 
emergency response efforts during the 2011 wildfire season. Each of the participants 
provided knowledge and understanding to the issues primarily important to the purpose 
of this study (Patton, 2002). I interviewed seven leaders in the TFS [Name] branch, 
which was the point when data saturation occurred (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 
2009). Collectively, the participants had 168 years of experience working for the TFS 
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and 215 total years of firefighting and emergency management. Individual attributes of 
the TFS leaders were not disclosed to maintain the confidentiality of the participants.  
Data Collection 
Interviews 
I conducted interviews for this study because “interviewing is necessary when we 
cannot observe behavior, feelings, or how people interpret the world around them. It is 
also necessary to interview when we are interested in past events that are impossible to 
replicate” (Merriam, 2009, p. 88). The interviews were semi-structured, and they loosely 
followed a set of interview questions derived from a protocol.  
The interview questions were created based on the Critical Incident Technique 
(CIT). The CIT collects a record of specific evaluations and observations regarding a 
certain situation from those best qualified to do so (Flanagan, 1954). Using the CIT 
technique, I created an interview protocol, which was then peer reviewed by faculty 
experienced in qualitative research to enhance the likelihood of gathering relevant data 
to answer the research question previously mentioned. Using the protocol as a guide, I 
asked the participants to answer questions and make statements that served as a basis for 
the findings of this study.  
I obtained permission to use dictation software prior to beginning this study for 
the purposes of gathering direct quotations from the participants. This software was 
supposed to collect the participants’ words verbatim during the interviews and 
concurrently input their words into a document. However, the software malfunctioned 
repeatedly during the interviews and was not a reliable source of information. Therefore, 
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I took detailed field notes during the interviews to capture the data from participants. I 
chose not to audiotape the interviews so that the participants felt more comfortable 
openly sharing their experiences with me. Effort was taken to collect direct quotations 
from participants when something particularly perceived as interesting or important was 
said during the interviews (Patton, 2002). Steps were taken to ensure accuracy of the 
field notes, such as asking participants to restate their answers if I was not able to 
capture their answers fully the first time.  I also asked follow-up questions when 
clarification or further information was needed. The interviews lasted approximately one 
hour with each participant, and ended when the interview was no longer productive 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I determined the interview to no longer be productive when 
participants began repeating the same answers and information to me from earlier in the 
interview. At the end of each interview, interviewees were given the opportunity to add 
any final comments or information they believed was relevant to the study in addition to 
the questions they had already answered.  
Confidentiality 
 Confidentiality of the participants was maintained through a coding process. No 
specific, demographic information was provided about the participants as it could have 
been used to link their responses to their identities. The names and data collected from 
the participants are referenced by a number (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) throughout this study. 
Names of the participants were linked to their specific code and kept in a confidential 
key that only I accessed.   
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Document Analysis 
 Even though interviews were an excellent source of qualitative data, they needed 
to be considered in light of other interviews and sources of data (Merriam, 2009). I 
collected documents and records, which helped answer the research question this study 
addressed (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Documents of all types can help uncover meaning, 
develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research question (Merriam, 
2009). Therefore, this study also included data collected from two other sources: 
documentation and archival records. I collected archival wildfire data from 2011, TFS 
documents, and a personal document outlining a TFS leader’s guiding principles. 
Personal documents gave me a glimpse of what the author believed was significant to 
making decisions (Merriam, 2009). Documents used in this study were coded as follows: 
SD1, SD2, SD3, and SD4. These documents and records were valuable to this study as 
they informed how TFS leaders made decisions during the 2011 wildfire season. 
Data Analysis 
The data collected in this study were analyzed using the constant comparative 
method (Glaser & Strauss, 2009). Data were constantly compared to identify categories 
and themes that had similar meaning. Open and axial coding was used to categorize the 
data (Merriam, 2009). Open coding involved tagging relevant units of data. I used axial 
coding to organize related units of data into descriptive categories and themes. After 
these categories and themes were identified, they were named based on what I observed 
from the data (Merriam, 2009). The categories and themes were then referenced to draw 
conclusions and make recommendations. 
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Trustworthiness 
There were several steps I took to ensure trustworthiness of the findings 
described in this study. I considered the credibility, dependability, transferability, and 
confirmability of data collected in this study. 
Credibility 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), credibility means that data were 
collected in such a way that there was high probability of the findings’ truth value, and 
the findings of the study were approved by the members who sourced them. 
Triangulation of the data was one way this study established credibility. Triangulation 
occurs when data are cross-referenced using multiple sources of data (Denzin, 1973). 
Additionally, triangulation of data can occur by gathering multiple participant 
perspectives that complement one another (Merriam, 2009). I triangulated information 
gathered from participant interviews with other participant interviews along with 
historical documents and records concerning the 2011 wildfire season. I also ensured the 
data collected during the interviews were accurate by sending the interview transcripts to 
the participants in order for them to edit, add, or remove information as needed. By 
doing this, I allowed participants to correct my recording of the data if errors existed. 
This process is referred to as member checks or participant validation (Merriam, 2009). 
Additionally, I sought multiple peer examinations of the data collected and consequently 
the findings that were presented as a result of this study. The peers who examined my 
data and findings were faculty members who were experienced in conducting qualitative 
research. Peer examination or peer debriefing is the process of divulging details of the 
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study and data collected to a disinterested third party so that person(s) may explore and 
analyze the results of the study. This process helps me as the researcher stay honest 
when analyzing data and presenting the findings as the peer explores my biases and basis 
for data interpretation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In addition to establishing credibility, I 
ensured dependability of this study using similar methods. 
Dependability & Confirmability 
Dependability ensures the findings are consistent with how the data were 
collected during the study (Merriam, 2009). Likewise, confirmability ensures the 
findings are consistent with the actual data that were collected during the study (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985). This study used triangulation and peer reviews of the data as two 
methods of ensuring dependability and confirmability. I also created an audit trail as 
another method to ensure dependability and confirmability. An audit trail is a record of 
how the data were collected, coded, and used throughout the study. (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). I utilized the audit trail to describe findings, which were then used to draw 
conclusions. The audit trail was audited by both interested and disinterested third party 
individuals to ensure dependability and confirmability. These third party individuals 
were faculty members who have experience conducting qualitative research. The audit 
trail (along with other methods) was used also to ensure transferability of the study.  
Transferability 
Transferability enhances the possibility of the results of a study to be transferred 
to a similar setting or situation (Merriam, 2009).  I described the findings using rich, 
thick description, which included specific quotes from participants, documents, and 
   
 
28 
 
artifacts. I did this so the reader could understand the context of how decisions were 
made during the 2011 wildfire season.  
Positionality of the Researcher 
 Because this was a qualitative study, I as the researcher, was the sole instrument 
for gathering and interpreting the data associated with this study (Patton, 2002). 
Therefore, it is important the readers have an understanding of the background, biases, 
and perspectives I held, and how they may have affected the findings of this study. I am 
a leadership studies graduate student who has a passion for service-oriented 
organizations, which the TFS could be considered. I recognized my positive bias of the 
TFS and, to the best of my ability, put this bias aside in order to perform this study. I 
underwent critical, self-reflection throughout this study to ensure an ethical approach to 
identifying and reporting the findings. This critical self-reflection helped to mitigate any 
biases, personal beliefs, and assumptions I held that may have affected the integrity of 
this study. Lastly, I had no personal relationship with any of the TFS participants prior to 
beginning this study.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
This study sought to address the following research question: How did leaders of 
the Texas A&M Forest Service make decisions during the 2011 wildfire season? To 
answer this question, I asked the participants to discuss specific decisions they made and 
information they had to consider when making those decisions. The results revealed 
several factors that influenced how leaders made decisions in 2011. I referred to these 
factors as categories and themes according to the data analysis methods described in 
Chapter III. The categories identified, which influenced the decisions made by the TFS 
leaders during the 2011 wildfire season, were the following: Communication, Culture of 
the TFS, Reputation of the TFS, Safety, Accounting for Fire Environment, and 
Distribution of Resources. I also described a final category that emerged, which was 
labeled Lessons Learned, where the participants discussed changes they made and new 
systems they created during and after the 2011 wildfire season. Each of the categories 
was referenced in Table 1 along with their themes (and subthemes) if they existed within 
each category. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Categories, Themes, and Subthemes Used to Describe Data 
  Notes.  Most categories include themes, which are listed directly to the right and down from each category. Some themes include subthemes, which are listed in the same order as themes are to categories.   
 
Categories 
 
 
 
Themes 
 
Subthemes 
 
Communications 
 
Culture of the TFS 
 
 
 
Reputation of the TFS 
 
Safety as a Priority 
 
 
Accounting for Fire Environment 
 
Distribution of Resources 
 
 
Lessons Learned 
  
Interagency Distribution  
Public Information Distribution 
Behavior and Team Dynamics 
Accountability 
Staffing and Training 
Policies and Standards 
Honesty and Integrity 
Stakeholder Satisfaction 
Human Safety 
Minimizing Loss 
Dealing with Casualties and Loss 
 
 
Human Capital 
Equipment 
Financial 
General Changes 
New Systems Created 
    
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interagency Support 
 
 
Resources and Communication 
Land Owner Liaison Team 
Sharing Public Information 
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Communication 
 Communication emerged as a category participants greatly discussed that 
informed how the leaders made decisions during the 2011 wildfire season (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7). This category was the most discussed category, and contained the richest amount 
of data from the participant interviews, which was why it was listed as the first category 
of my findings. The TFS leaders communicated amongst themselves to determine the 
best course of action during specific wildfires based on the threat and growth potential of 
those wildfires. “I provided information regarding the threat…of the wildfire potential. I 
provided this information to the leadership team, which they used to make decisions. I 
supplied this information in daily briefing meetings and sometimes even multiple times 
per day” (3). TFS leaders also communicated within their specific teams during regular 
briefing meetings in 2011. Participant 6 stated that the aviation team had daily 
conference calls with safety experts to ensure they were maintaining safe practices 
throughout the 2011 wildfire season. 
Additionally, TFS leaders shared multiple instances where information was 
communicated effectively among the TFS organization, interagency IMTs, and the 
public of Texas. They also shared several examples of miscommunication as well. Two 
themes emerged from this category: Interagency Information Distribution and Public 
Information Distribution.  
Interagency Information Distribution 
TFS leaders learned how to communicate with interagency IMTs as participant 2 
reflected, “We learned how the agencies that made up the IMTs communicated both 
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formally and informally, which was an intangible asset” (2). Much of the 
communication, which occurred between the TFS and interagency IMTs, were in-briefs 
and after action reviews (AARs). An in-brief was described as a preparatory session 
prior to entering a specific incident to deal with a wildfire or crisis. In this briefing 
session, firefighters would discuss safety, risks, and critical concerns to “ensure accurate 
situation awareness” (National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2007, p. 51). After an 
incident, firefighters ideally would perform an AAR, which is “a structured review or 
de-brief process of an event, focused on performance standards, that enables participants 
to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain 
strengths and improve on weaknesses…” (National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2014, 
p. 23). 
We recognized that having a good in-brief and de-brief… were keys to success 
for these teams. We did our best to in-brief the IMTs and inform them how to 
work with the local governments and private landowners before they moved into 
an area to start fighting fires. However, due to the severity and frequency of fires 
in 2011, we were not able to in-brief every resource. I would also try to follow-
up and de-brief each resource after they were done. However, this was not 
always possible (7). 
As participant 7 said, despite their best efforts to in-brief and debrief every interagency 
IMT, the extreme conditions in 2011 did not allow this to occur, which led to issues 
between these non-TFS firefighters and private landowners. “The non-TFS personnel did 
not communicate well with the private land owners and as a result the TFS got a bad 
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reputation” (1). Participant 7 suggested reasons why the non-TFS firefighters 
miscommunicated with Texas landowners and stakeholders. “IMTs and other out of state 
resources sometimes had difficulties with adapting to Texas culture and ideologies of 
local governments and private landowners. They did not always know how to 
communicate with these stakeholders effectively” (7).  
Public Information Distribution 
 Another form of information distribution the TFS leaders mentioned was 
between the TFS and citizens of Texas. Participant 5 stated, “We need to keep folks 
informed and share a unified message.” Other TFS leaders echoed this sentiment as 
participant 6 said, “The TFS is a very open agency when it comes to communication. We 
like to keep people aware of what we are doing at any given time” (6). Participant 4 had 
a responsibility as part of his team’s role to convey a “unified message to the public” (4). 
“[My team] established an integrated plan to deal with all the media, elected officials, 
and general public. I trusted these people who proved themselves and led the TFS media 
response through the 2011 fire season” (4).   
Likewise, participant 5 shared his experience of keeping the general public and 
elected officials informed in 2011:  
In September during the Bastrop fire, I was primarily stationed at TFS 
headquarters dealing with a tremendous amount of information requests …my 
role (one of them) was to keep the other factors (budgetary, legislative, media) 
taken care of to ensure that Operations kept running and addressing the wildfires. 
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I helped answer questions that the legislature, media, and the general public had 
about our processes (5). 
Participant 5 also dealt with the legislative “Sunset” process in 2011. “During this 
process we (the TFS) undergo a review and audit that determines if our existence is 
justified as an agency. I was responsible for responding to audit requests and questions 
that the legislators and staff had for the TFS” (5). Participant 5 was not the only TFS 
leader who personally dealt with elected officials in 2011, as participant 6 stated, “I 
provided some information to elected officials about fires in 2011. I learned that it is 
better to share information with elected officials proactively rather than waiting for them 
to ask you for information.” Additionally, participant 2 shared, “I had a very powerful 
elected official call me to ensure that we were doing everything possible to keep his 
citizens safe... This was impressive and humbling to me that he would call” (2).  
TFS leaders expressed the importance of communicating openly and honestly 
with the people of Texas during 2011. For instance, participant 6 described a particular 
online information distribution tool (dispatch tracker), which allowed misinformation to 
be seen by the public. The online tool was intended to distribute fire condition 
information to the TFS and other firefighting agencies. Any online user could access the 
dispatch tracker containing information called in by Texas citizens, who reported the 
fires as they observed them.  
Media, elected officials, and the public could access these records, which were 
not always accurate as they were based on information directly called in by the 
person who saw the incident. Events were exaggerated many times. People 
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would say that multiple homes were on fire, when there may have only been one 
on fire. In 2011, people were on pins and needles because of the inaccurate 
information they could access. (6) 
As a result, the TFS had to diffuse a number of situations that arose primarily with the 
media and legislative members who were fed incorrect or incomplete information from 
the dispatch tracker (6). Situations like these led to a series of lessons learned by the TFS 
leaders.  
Culture of the TFS 
Culture was another category participants discussed that informed how the 
leaders made decisions during the 2011 wildfire season (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Within this 
category were several themes including: Behavior and Team Dynamics, Accountability, 
Training and Staffing, and Policies and Standards. 
Behavior and Team Dynamics 
Elements of employee behavior and team dynamics among TFS leaders were 
referenced by all the participants in this study (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Participant 1 stressed 
the importance of falling back on team decision making rather than individual decision 
making. Participant 2 echoed this sentiment. When describing the importance of a team 
he said, “It’s very difficult to describe the value of a close-knit team that’s motivated by 
shared goals and values. We all want to do the right thing. We have a level of cohesion 
that is invaluable” (2). He went on to say that each member of his team stands out 
individually, but they each watch out for each other and care about the greater good of 
the team (2). These statements were affirmed by a personal document containing a TFS 
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leader’s guiding principles, “Help others be successful. Not only is this a good thing to 
do, you will also develop allies. This includes your subordinates, peers, and individuals 
that are in support and administrative jobs” (SD2).  
Individual contributions within the team were also discussed, as participant 3 
said, “We (the leadership team) worked together…My role was primarily to offer 
information and support to the leadership team to make decisions. I and my team were 
there to help define the scope, complexity, and operational tempo of the 2011 wildfires.” 
Others agreed that having a team with a common direction was a valuable component of 
their success (1, 2, 5, 7). While the TFS [Department] leaders indicated they worked 
well as a team, one participant elaborated on an issue he had with one of his employees, 
which ultimately led to that person being demoted. However, this event turned out to be 
a positive move for his department as he said it “was a great opportunity to set the tone 
and bring the department together. It crumbled walls that were there previously…” (4). 
He said that after this event, morale was raised and other employees were empowered to 
do their jobs better (4). 
Participant 1 recognized the importance of having time off to rest even during 
crisis situations. He believed that after three straight weeks of work, TFS employees 
should take four to five days to rest and recuperate before returning to the field (1). 
However, this was not always possible during the 2011 fire season. “I made a lot of 
personal sacrifices including lots of travelling and missing time with my family. I 
practically had a second home in Merkel [Texas] along with other TFS leaders” (4). TFS 
leaders were committed to their jobs until the fires were out. Participant 1 remembered 
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working 21 days straight before taking any time off along with many other TFS 
employees. He was committed to his job. It was difficult for him to take time off because 
he was so invested in the role he was filling (1). Likewise, participant 6 stated, “It is hard 
to take time off when situations (like 2011 [wildfire season]) are happening.” 
Accountability 
Participants shared stories that illustrated the importance of accountability among 
TFS employees as well as other firefighting agencies that assisted the TFS during the 
2011 wildfire season (4, 5, 6). Participant 4 shared a story involving a TFS employee 
that did not follow orders and was held accountable for her actions. 
At one point during the 2011 wildfire season, one of my [Department] teams was 
assigned to go to a specific town in Texas to respond to fires in that area. The 
team leader did not follow orders and instead took the team to another location 
she thought was more important. I was in Merkel when I found out about this. I 
demoted the team leader and replaced her with a newer employee who had not 
worked extensively with the [Department] team before and was not accustomed 
to their old ways of operating. (4) 
While this situation was not ideal for participant 4, he believed it was the right call to set 
the precedent that misconduct would not be tolerated and employees were accountable 
for their actions (4). Additionally, the TFS monitored outside firefighting agencies to 
ensure they were following procedures correctly. “I was involved in at least 3-4 
decisions per day that needed to be made to keep critical operations moving forward… 
[which included] making sure that private (insurance-company) [non-TFS] firefighters 
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had access, but were also controlled and kept accountable” (5). The TFS organization 
was also held accountable for the federal resources they used to fight fires. Participant 6 
chose to bring in federal safety experts to audit TFS use of aviation resources to ensure 
they were being safe and responsible with those resources. “I also wanted to keep open 
lines of communication with the federal agencies whose aviation resources we were 
using. We are an open book to them” (6).  
Staffing and Training 
 Participant 4 previously mentioned staffing issues with one employee in 
particular who was demoted as a result of her actions, which turned out to be good for 
the TFS. This was because some employees were set in old ways of operating, and were 
not willing to follow new policies that the TFS had adopted.  Participant 4 reflected, “By 
getting rid of the previous team leader….it sent a positive shockwave that allowed the 
[Department] to be accepted throughout the TFS” (4). TFS leaders also dealt with an 
influx of new employees, as close to fifty employees [including firefighters] were hired 
between 2009 and the 2011 wildfire season (7). “We trained the new employees and 
tried to bring them up to speed with what was happening in 2011. We had to adjust their 
amount of training time due to the needs we had to fight fires in the field. We had Just-
in-Time training for the new employees” (7). Participant 7 went on to say that these 
employees were able to gain a lot of real world training and experience from the 2011 
wildfire season. 
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Policies and Standards 
 A supporting document asserted a stance TFS leaders hold on indecision. 
“Indecision is a course of action; it is the decision to do nothing. You will be faced with 
situations that require a decision be made quickly. Make one. If it turns out not to be the 
best decision or just flat out wrong, observe, analyze, correct and move forward” (SD2).  
 Several TFS leaders discussed similarities they saw between their policies and 
standards and the military’s policies and standards in response to crisis situations (2, 3, 
7). “We strive to be a High Reliability Organization similar to the military. We follow 
many of the same procedures they do. Failure is not an option” (2). Participant 3 stated, 
“We followed military-like standards and protocols to manage the situations/wildfires 
that arose. These procedures work well for us just like they do for the military as we are 
faced with similar, stressful situations….It can’t get more chaotic than a battlefield.” 
Participant 7 explained their policies and standards in terms of leading an army of troops 
into war. “The troops have to be supported in order to fight a war. We treated our 
resources the same way” (7).  
Reputation of the TFS 
 Reputation of the TFS was another category that emerged from the data (1, 2, 4, 
5, 6, 7). Two themes, which described this category were the following: Honesty and 
Integrity as well as Stakeholder Satisfaction. 
Honesty and Integrity 
 The TFS leaders who participated in this study stated honesty and integrity, or in 
other words, “the right thing to do” (1, 2, 6), was an integral component to making 
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decisions. Participant 2 said that their agency philosophy is to always tell the truth no 
matter what. He stated, “No matter how bad the situation is, tell the truth” (2). He also 
added, “…the TFS is considered trustworthy by other agencies” (2). This was supported 
by document SD2, which emphasized, “Always, always try to do the right thing. Not 
only is it the correct way to live your life but people sense that this is your motivation. It 
will become part of your reputation” (SD2). The TFS also fought to make sure the truth 
was told, and information was communicated accurately in 2011. Participant 4 shared 
this story: 
There was one event where we had to send PIOs (public information officers) to 
an airbase to cover media attention where they (the media) were trying to say that 
the TFS was shorthanded and were not getting the resources they needed. This 
was not true, and our PIOs did a good job of accurately portraying these facts to 
them. (4) 
In addition to maintaining their honesty and integrity, the TFS leaders were also 
concerned with stakeholder satisfaction. 
Stakeholder Satisfaction 
 One of the strongly held beliefs TFS leaders communicated during the interviews 
was that the TFS had not done their job right if stakeholders were not content when the 
wildfire was put out (1, 5, 7). “We have not done our job properly if we leave and 
someone is not happy with what we’ve done!” (1). Unfortunately, the TFS could not 
satisfy everyone in 2011.  
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In 2011, a specific ranch manager, Joe, was especially not happy with the way 
his ranch and his neighbors were treated during one of the fires. He was not 
communicated with very well at all by the non-TFS firefighters that were on his 
land. Since that time, the TFS has made it a priority to communicate and serve 
the landowners regardless of the situation. (1) 
Even though it was not TFS firefighters responsible for the treatment of Joe’s ranch, the 
TFS was blamed because the it was the agency responsible for interagency coordination 
of non-TFS firefighters. Participant 5 shared a similar story that was told to him about a 
Texas landowner who was unhappy with how she was treated during the wildfires on her 
property: 
One lady said they fought the fire for 3 days trying to keep her house and grass 
(food for her cattle) alive. They were happy to see the firefighters (non-TFS) 
arrive, then instead of putting the fire out directly, they back off a significant 
distance, put in control lines and burnt out most of their pasture/grass.  When 
asked they said it was safer and better for her pasture to do it that way, not 
recognizing that that grass was their cattle forage and livelihood. (5) 
Even though the TFS was not directly responsible for the treatment of this lady, Joe, and 
others who were disappointed with the way they were treated during the 2011 wildfire 
season, the TFS made efforts to rectify these situations. “We have a responsibility to 
fight fires and to keep people informed. We need to make sure they know what we are 
doing and why, without them having to ask” (5). One way TFS rectified these situations 
was by sending high-level, TFS leaders to personally visit the stakeholders who were 
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treated poorly by non-TFS firefighters. “I was involved with following up with 
landowners and cattle raiser’s associations. I listened to their complaints about how they 
were treated during the wildfires on their property (mostly I listened as they voiced those 
complaints to our [Executive Leader])” (5). They did this because they did not believe 
their job was done until the citizens were satisfied. TFS leaders did what they could to 
ensure stakeholder satisfaction to the best of their ability. “Success in this case meant 
that the citizens wanted us to come back in the future after we had finished fighting the 
fire in their area” (7). Stakeholder satisfaction was a concern for the TFS as it impacted 
their reputation among Texas citizens. 
Safety as a Priority 
Safety was a fourth category that emerged from the data (1, 2, 4, 6). There were 
three themes that developed out of the data regarding safety: Human Safety, Minimizing 
Loss, and Dealing with Casualties and Loss.  
Human Safety 
Keeping firefighters safe was a responsibility that TFS leaders had during the 
2011 wildfire season. Participant 1 explained a situation where he had to send 
firefighters to a remote location to fight a certain fire during 2011. Because the location 
was so remote, he had to allocate resources (firemen) that would be able to support 
themselves. He had to find lodging for those firemen near the location of the fire rather 
than allow them to travel home after a full day of fighting the fire. He did this for their 
safety, so they would not drive home when they were too physically tired to do so. It was 
the right thing to do for those firefighters in order to keep them safe (1). Participant 6 
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discussed aviation firefighter safety; “During 2011 we flew 17,000 hours on fires and 
dropped 39 million gallons of water and retardant. We put in a lot of effort to maintain 
aviation safety. I made the decision to have an aviation safety conference call every 
morning” (6). Participant 6 also said that the average flight time before an accident 
occurred is 3500 hours. However, the TFS did not experience a single, major aviation 
accident during 2011 (6). “I know that I can’t get complacent. It keeps me on my toes to 
maintain our safety record” (6). Participant 6 wanted to be proactive at maintaining the 
TFS aviation safety record. In addition to ensuring firefighter safety, the TFS leaders 
evaluated how they could minimize citizens’ loss in 2011. 
Minimizing Loss 
Participants discussed how they evaluated what they thought could be saved from 
fires and what could not (1, 2). “Our goal is to not allow any ‘project’ fires to occur and 
to put them out as quickly as possible to minimize exposure to losses and reduce the 
possibility of fires growing into project fires” (2). In 2011, participant 1 evaluated when 
a neighborhood or subdivision could still be saved, or when it was impossible to save. 
He had to make decisions to take resources out of areas in order to move them to areas 
where they could have a chance to save property and homes. Even if they were the right 
decisions, major losses were still incurred. An example he gave was about the Bastrop 
fire, “…most homes were lost in the 1st and 2nd days. They could not be saved due to 
the fuels, wind and overall fire environment” (1). Unfortunately, loss was a reality in 
2011, and the TFS leaders had to deal with it in difficult ways. 
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Dealing with Casualties and Loss 
Many homes and several lives were lost in Texas from the 2011 wildfires. The 
TFS leaders had to handle both types of losses that year as a result (2, 4). Participant 4 
reflected, “Every week, fire would take 2-3 homes. Branch directors would regularly call 
for PFA (post fire assessment) teams to assess homes lost across Texas” (4). Not only 
did they deal with homes lost to Texas citizens, TFS leaders also dealt with the loss of a 
non-TFS firefighter, who died from hyperthermia while fighting a fire near Mineral 
Wells, Texas (SD1). Participant 2 shared: 
The IM (incident management) team that was managing the fire where the 
fatality occurred took it very personally and were in a state of emotional shock. I 
made the decision to go to them immediately after he died and share in the 
experience with them. They appreciated my decision to come to them, however, 
they were still in shock when I arrived. 
The fires were treacherous in 2011, and were unlike anything most of the TFS leadership 
had ever encountered (3). Participants discussed how the fire environment affected 
decisions they made during the wildfire season in 2011. 
Accounting for Fire Environment 
 These were some questions that TFS considered on a daily basis during 2011: 
“Where was the fire burning? What was burning? What are the weather conditions like? 
What types of fuel (grass, timber, and houses) are being burned in a given area? Are 
there any natural breaks to slow the fires down?” (1). Each of these questions informed 
the overall span of control that the TFS had on any given wildfire that burned in 2011. 
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“Sometimes, the fires and weather are just too dangerous and there is nothing that can be 
done. In these situations fires can be a force of nature similar to a tornado or a hurricane” 
(2). Participant 1 reflected on the Bastrop fire and how it was impossible to fight at times 
because of strong winds:  
The wind element is a key consideration for aviation units. There was nothing 
that could be done to save Bastrop in those early days because of strong winds. 
Aircraft early on, would not [have] been effective, due to the severity of the fire 
and effects of the wind, even if they [aircraft] had been sitting and available in 
the immediate area, due to the wind being so high, they would not have even 
been able to fly (1). 
Participant 2 likewise said, “We admitted when the fires were too strong and dangerous 
to fight. Some thought this may be similar to admitting weakness, but in reality we were 
setting realistic expectations for our capabilities” (2). There were a host of other factors 
that increased wildfire growth potential as participant 3 elaborated, “In 2011, fires 
occurred all over the state and the span of control was at its maximum. [It was] the most 
active and complex fire season I’ve ever experienced because of all three factors (scope, 
complexity, and operational tempo).” To manage these fires, TFS leaders had to manage 
resources efficiently and effectively. 
Distribution of Resources 
 Allocation of resources was another category that emerged from the findings as a 
factor that influenced how decisions were made in 2011 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). There were 
several different types of resources that participants discussed including human, 
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equipment, and financial. These types of resources were described in the following 
themes: Human Capital, Equipment, and Financial.   
Human Capital 
“People are your most valuable asset. You must do your best to understand your 
personnel; their needs and expectations, both personal and professionally. Communicate 
this in words and actions” (SD2). Additionally, this theme was discussed by all 
participants in this study (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). A subtheme that emerged from this theme 
was Interagency Support. In addition to using TFS employees, the TFS leaders brought 
in thousands of other firemen and women from outside agencies to fight fires in 2011 
(2).  
Interagency Support 
In 2011, interagency support was needed to gain and maintain a span of control 
(3). Participant 2 further explained the process of requesting additional non-TFS 
resources: 
We used the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) made up of state 
and federal agencies to bring in close to a dozen IMTs during the 2011 wildfire 
season. We mobilized over 16,000 people that year to fight the fires throughout 
Texas. This would not have worked unless the training across the NWCG 
agencies was homogenous. Even though firefighters were from across the nation, 
these individuals were all trained using the same curriculum, and they were able 
to immediately make an impact once they arrived at the fires in Texas (2). 
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TFS leaders knew they needed these interagency human resources to fight fires in 2011; 
they knew the TFS would not be able to handle them on their own (1, 3, 5). Participant 3 
reflected, “In 2011, the scope was statewide. All TFS resources were exceeded and we 
had to go beyond our resources and ask for help from IMTs in order to maintain a span 
of control” (3). The month of April was mentioned as a particularly negative time during 
the 2011 season when multiple, major fires started (1, 2, 5, 6, 7). April 9th was identified 
as a historically “bad” day for fires (6, 7). “During that time [April] we had over 2000 
firefighters active across the state most of whom were federal and from other states” (5). 
In addition to managing interagency personnel, the TFS leaders had to deal with 
exhaustion during 2011.  
Equipment 
 Allocating and moving equipment was another resource factor that TFS leaders 
considered during 2011 (1, 2, 3, 6, 7). Participant 1 said he had to make daily decisions 
about where to move critical resources including helicopters, tankers, dozers, and hand 
crews. Much of participant 6’s responsibility dealt with aviation resources that the TFS 
used during 2011. “A lot of my time was managing the aviation resources. All of them 
are on federal contracts except for the ones owned by the National Guard” (6). 
Respondent 7 likewise dealt with moving a number of resources during 2011. “We had 
to bring in additional people (hand crews), aircraft, fire apparatus and bulldozers to fight 
certain fires that season. I had to consider when to bring these resources in and how long 
to keep them in certain areas” (7). Like human resources, equipment resources cost 
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money to maintain and operate; fiscal responsibility was another factor TFS leaders had 
to consider in 2011. 
Financial 
TFS leaders discussed the importance of fiscal responsibility when ordering 
equipment and other resources during 2011 (2, 5, 7). However, they spent money as 
needed to effectively combat the wildfires. Participants illustrated this when he talked 
about a DC-10 aircraft the TFS used in 2011. Participants estimated that this aircraft 
could hold six to seven times the amount of fire retardant from other standard 
firefighting aircraft, however, it cost thousands of dollars per hour to operate. Participant 
2 reflected, “We used this aircraft [DC-10] in 2011 even though it costs a very high 
amount of money to operate. We are a frugal organization, but it was the right thing to 
do to bring in that aircraft to fight the fires. So we did” (2). Participant 7 echoed this 
when he discussed managing resources in 2011. “Every resource we brought in cost 
something... We have a guiding principle, which I considered when making the decision 
to bring in additional resources. The principle is that we are ‘providing good stewardship 
to the people of Texas’” (7). Even with responsible management of financial resources, 
the TFS did go over budget in 2011 due to the severity of conditions that year (5). Even 
so, TFS kept elected officials up-to-date as participant 5 explained, “I had to keep the 
state legislature informed of why we were going over budget and how we were using 
those financial resources” (5).  
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Lessons Learned 
 TFS leaders discussed lessons they learned during and as a result of the 2011 
wildfire season (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). When asked if he would change anything in future 
situations participant 3 said, “In the future, we (leadership team) would use the same 
strategies, but add our experience to improve the way we handle similar situations” (3). 
While overall strategies may remain the same, TFS leaders discussed several issues they 
would handle differently as a result of decisions they made and events that occurred 
during the 2011 wildfire season. Those issues were separated into two themes: General 
Changes and New Systems Created.  
General Changes  
 TFS leaders reflected on what they would do differently or changes they would 
make as a result of events that occurred in 2011. Document SD2 supported the TFS 
leaders’ notion of incorporating change, “Life is what happens when you’re busy making 
plans. Change is constant; embrace it. Become an advocate for change that results in 
positive effects…” (SD2). A subtheme of change that emerged from the data was named 
Resources and Communication. 
Resources and Communication 
 Some issues arose among TFS employees that did not understand why TFS 
leaders made certain decisions. Participant 4 explained a situation where this occurred in 
his department: 
I made the decision to create new PFA procedures that included more flexibility 
of the teams and new people operating on the teams who were willing to 
   
 
50 
 
cooperate with the new procedures... I had to completely start over with a new 
system and insert new employees to perform PFAs. They were required to be: 
decisive yet flexible, and follow an autocratic process. (4) 
This change had backlash that participant 4 would have rather avoided if it were 
possible. He further reflected on the situation:  
I would have taken a step back. It was a very sudden change. A rift was created 
between an employee and the agency. It even created a wedge between her 
county and our agency. I would have worked with this employee more and 
helped her try to understand why we had to change the PFA process rather than 
changing it abruptly with little input from that employee. (4) 
Participant 1 divulged another situation where his employees did not fully understand a 
decision he made. Participant 1 had to send resources from one group of fires to other 
fires, where he believed those resources would have a more positive impact. Sometimes 
his subordinates did not understand these decisions. He said, in the future, he would 
better inform his subordinates of the reasoning behind his choices to send resources 
certain places so they could have a better understanding (1).  
Participant 1 also said, in the future, he would want to know who the (non-TFS 
firefighter) resources are that are coming to aid in the firefighting efforts. This is so the 
TFS leaders can better communicate with the non-TFS firefighters about dealing with 
private landowners and other issues specific to fighting fires in Texas (1). Participant 5 
said, “One of the conclusions is that we need to have had TFS leadership with the 
federal/non-TFS firefighters.” Participant 7 echoed, “I would also ensure that we have a 
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TFS representative with each IMT team in the future.” Issues like this led to new 
processes and systems created to ensure similar situations like this do not happen again 
in the future. 
New Systems Created 
Land Owner Liaison Team  
TFS leaders identified several areas that could be improved from what they 
experienced in 2011. One of those areas was improving communication between private 
landowners and firefighters (both TFS and non-TFS) (1, 5, 7). A team called the “Land 
Owner Liaison Team” (7) was created by a process described by participant 5. 
I lead the process to ensure we bring local landowners into the decisions on large 
fires, particularly when working with federal agencies and outside IMTs. This 
process included the Texas and Southwest Cattle Raisers Association, Texas 
Sheep and Goat Raisers Association and AgriLife representatives who we would 
communicate with during a wildfire. These organizations would then provide 
two-way communications to locals in the area who could potentially be affected. 
(5) 
In addition to utilizing the Land Owner Liaison Team, participant 7 suggested an 
additional measure of accountability for the IMTs. “I would ensure that every IMT and 
every firefighter participates in a region-specific in-briefing prior to…fighting fires. I 
would also ensure that every IMT and firefighter participates in a de-briefing after the 
fires are out” (7).  
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Sharing Public Information 
Other systems were created to address ways that the public and media received 
information. The dispatch tracker system was an issue during 2011 that participant 6 
discussed.  
I decided that we needed to only show limited information to the public. As soon 
as the [2011] fire season ended we contracted a professional to build a new 
dispatch tracker display system. We wanted to be transparent, but only with 
accurate, truthful information… I wished we could have changed the dispatch 
tracker in the middle of the fire season, however, it was too important for the first 
responders and firefighting personnel to make any major changes during the 
wildfire season. (6). 
Participant 6 further said after the TFS implemented the new dispatch tracker system, “it 
was the right thing to do by restricting access to the [old] dispatch tracker. We will 
continue to be transparent, but also truthful and accurate with the information we 
present” (6).  
Participant 4 discussed a similar issue regarding public information distribution 
that led to the creation of a new system. “Our IMTs can handle basic interviews that 
address normal fires that occur, however, 2011 produced fires that were bigger and 
lasted longer than we have dealt with previously” (4). Because of this, he had to adapt 
during the fire season and create a new system to deal with the media.  “My team had to 
come up with a staffing plan to communicate with the media…I brought in key members 
of my PI (public information) staff to help me create a new system to deal with all the 
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new media attention…” (4). Using this new system, the TFS was able to more 
effectively and efficiently communicate with the media during the 2011 wildfire system. 
Summary of Findings 
In addition to lessons that the TFS leaders learned, there were several other 
categories that emerged as a result of this study. Each category represented factors that 
TFS leaders considered as part of decisions they made during the 2011 wildfire season. 
These categories included: Communication, Culture of the TFS, Reputation of the TFS, 
Safety as a Priority, Accounting for Fire Environment, Distribution of Resources, and 
Lessons Learned. Specific stories and representative quotes from TFS leaders were used 
to describe each of these categories. Consequently, these categories helped to describe 
how TFS leaders made decisions during the 2011 wildfire season. In the next section, 
conclusions and recommendations are discussed based on the results of this study. 
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CHAPTER V  
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to describe how TFS leaders made decisions 
during the 2011 wildfire season. The research question that guided this study was the 
following: How did leaders of the Texas A&M Forest Service make decisions during the 
2011 wildfire season? The findings from this study included rich, descriptive data 
regarding how TFS leaders made decisions during the 2011 wildfire season. While the 
findings are not generalizable, the descriptive nature of this study provided for the 
findings to be transferable to similar contexts or situations in the future.  
Discussion of the Findings 
 The findings indicated several factors that influenced how TFS leaders made 
decisions during 2011. The factors identified in this study included: Communication, 
Culture, Reputation, Safety, Accounting for Fire Environment, and Distribution of 
Resources. Conclusions were made based on each of these factors. Additionally, an 
overarching category emerged: Lessons Learned. Conclusions were also made regarding 
the lessons learned that TFS leaders discussed. 
Communication 
 The findings indicated that much of how TFS leaders made decisions during 
2011 included some type of communication. Prior to the 2011 wildfire season, TFS 
leaders had not had as much experience dealing with interagency (non-TFS) IMTs, as 
they would have liked. This conclusion supports the seventh NDM characteristic as 
“multiple players” were involved in decision making during the 2011 wildfire season 
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(Zsambok & Klein, 1997, p. 5). The findings indicated several instances of 
miscommunication between the TFS and interagency IMTs along with instances of 
miscommunication between IMTs and Texas landowners. According to Coombs (2007b) 
miscommunication during a crisis can damage an organization’s reputation.  
TFS leaders recognized the reputation damage that occurred due to non-TFS 
IMTs’ miscommunication with landowners. TFS leaders went to great lengths to rectify 
the miscommunication that occurred between non-TFS IMTs and Texas landowners. 
TFS leaders prioritized sharing unified and clear messages to the public regarding the 
status of wildfires throughout the 2011 wildfire season.  
Culture 
 The culture of the TFS impacted how leaders made decisions. Cultural 
contributors included team decision making among TFS leaders, accountability among 
TFS employees and affiliates, training concerns, and military-like standards that the TFS 
follows. Of the eight NDM characteristics, this conclusion supports that decisions were 
made with consideration of feedback loops, multiple decision makers (i.e. multiple 
players), and organizational goals and norms (Zsambok & Klein, 1997). The findings 
suggested TFS leaders exemplified effective crisis leadership through their team 
decision making. The leaders displayed a level of trust in each other and their 
employees, which is required in effective crisis leadership (James & Wooten, 2005). 
Additionally, it can be concluded that TFS leaders displayed attributes found among 
those involved in a learning organization (Senge, 2006). The findings showed leaders 
were motivated by shared vision and goals during the 2011 wildfire season. Findings 
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also suggested that TFS leaders worked well individually (personal mastery) and as a 
team (Senge, 2006). If TFS leaders continue to work in the way they did during 2011, 
they should experience growth that allows them to operate more like a learning 
organization, which should enhance their leadership effectiveness during a crises in the 
future. 
TFS leaders were open to employees making mistakes and, learning from those 
mistakes. However, TFS leaders were not afraid to demote or get rid of employees who 
did not follow orders or could not be held accountable. It can also be concluded that the 
crisis situation in 2011 altered the training schedule for new TFS employees, as they 
were needed immediately to fight wildfires after getting hired. Consequently, after going 
through an abbreviated training program, they gained on-the-job training. While it is 
impossible to give this same experience to current, incoming employees, TFS leaders 
described this type of on-the-job training as invaluable. Employees who were hired 
during the 2011 wildfire season could pass along the experience they gained in 2011 to 
new employees through mentoring relationships. While it is not the same experience, the 
employees hired in 2011 could communicate valuable lessons they learned to new 
employees through a mentor/mentee relationship, which could also aid in the new 
employees indoctrination into TFS culture. 
It can be concluded from the findings that the TFS has similarities to an HRO. 
Diversity of thought is one of the greatest strengths of an HRO (Weick et al., 2008). TFS 
leaders shared a common bond in their goal to protect the people of Texas, however, 
they each had unique expertise and responsibilities that allowed them to work to 
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accomplish their goal. The findings suggested instances where TFS leaders dealt with 
multiple complex environments and were required to adapt accordingly, which is one of 
the tenants of an HRO. Additionally, TFS leaders saw their organization as one similar 
to a military organization and followed many of the same procedures the military follow. 
TFS leaders see similarities to the military in the way the TFS does not accept failure 
and it follows similar standards and protocols during crisis situations. Additionally, TFS 
leaders were able to make decisions based on their knowledge and expertise, which was 
another indicator of a HRO. These similarities between the TFS to a military 
organization and consequently a HRO, are positive attributes of the TFS. HROs must 
learn by investigating near failures, focusing on the dangers of success, and treating any 
failures they do experience as a learning opportunity. If the TFS learns like an HRO, 
they can more effectively mitigate and prevent wildfire destruction in the future. 
Reputation 
 Reputation was another factor that influenced how TFS leaders made decisions. 
This conclusion supports the sixth characteristic of the NDM paradigm, because 
decisions were made in consideration of the high reputational threats (i.e. high stakes) 
that were involved with fighting fires during the 2011 wildfire season (Zsambok & 
Klein, 1997). Two elements of reputation displayed in the results were satisfaction of the 
Texas stakeholders along with honesty and integrity of TFS operations. 
 With regard to honesty and integrity of TFS operations, it can be concluded that 
TFS leaders perceive that other organizations view the TFS as a trusted organization. 
Additionally, TFS leaders have a deeply held desire to maintain Texas landowners trust 
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and satisfaction. It can be concluded that while the TFS was not perfect in maintaining 
landowners’ trust or satisfaction, great effort was made to rectify situations where trust 
was broken during wildfire mitigation efforts in 2011. 
Safety as a Priority 
 Coombs (2007a) posited that evaluation of safety should be the most important 
factor for consideration during a crisis situation. Additionally, a preoccupation with 
safety is supported by Bourrier (1996), which posited that safety is a top priority for 
decision makers in an HRO. It can be concluded that firefighter safety was of utmost 
importance to TFS leaders during the 2011 wildfire season. Great efforts were made to 
care for firefighters both on the ground and in the air. This conclusion supports the first 
and second characteristics of NDM as TFS leaders had to work in “uncertain, dynamic 
environments” with “ill-structured problems” in order to keep people safe (Zsambok & 
Klein, 1997, p. 5). It can also be concluded that TFS aviation safety procedures were 
well established, as the TFS did not experience a major aviation accident during the 
2011 season, which was abnormal according to TFS leaders. TFS leaders performed well 
in this regard during the 2011 wildfire season, as they did not experience any TFS 
employee fatalities. 
 TFS leaders had to make difficult and sometimes unpopular decisions to evaluate 
whether or not properties could be saved during the 2011 wildfires. This conclusion 
aligned with the commitment to resilience of an HRO, as TFS leaders dealt with 
unexpected and pressure-filled situations (Weick et al., 2008). Additionally, this 
conclusion supports primary features of decision making according to the NDM 
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paradigm (Zsambok & Klein, 1997). TFS leaders had to deal with the uncertainty and 
ill-defined goals by choosing which houses or properties could be saved, and 
determining if there was even a possibility of saving those houses and properties. 
Deciding which homes and properties to save could be considered an ill-structured 
problem in a high stakes environment (people’s livelihoods were at stake) that was 
influenced by time stress (wildfires do not wait for decisions to be made) and multiple 
players (homeowners, firefighters, and politicians). Based on these conclusions, it can be 
inferred that TFS leaders engaged in naturalistic decision making during times like this 
in the 2011 wildfire season.  
Accounting for Fire Environment 
 The 2011 wildfire season was unlike any TFS leaders had ever seen, which 
presented challenges they had never faced. There were several instances during 2011 
where the TFS leaders had no control over the circumstances in several of the wildfires 
that occurred. TFS leaders were forced to tell their firefighters to mitigate losses rather 
than put out fires that were uncontrollable, which aligned with the fifth NDM 
characteristic of “shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals” that TFS leaders managed 
when making those decisions (Zsambok & Klein, 1997, p. 5). Situations like this also 
aligned with tenants of Macrocognition, which assert that decisions must be made in 
conditions that are ill understood and cannot be controlled or manipulated (Klein et al., 
2003). TFS leaders understood how to be realistic during crisis situations. They were 
able to make judgment calls about if particular wildfires were possible to fight or if the 
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conditions were too intense and needed time to wear down before they could be 
controlled. 
Distribution of Resources 
 Resource distribution was another factor TFS leaders considered when making 
decisions during the 2011 wildfire season. With regards to human resources, interagency 
firefighters and IMTs were indispensable during the 2011 wildfire season. TFS resources 
were exceeded and the TFS leaders recognized the need to bring in outside aid. By 
recognizing this, it can be concluded from the findings that TFS leaders exemplified a 
preoccupation with failure, sensitivity to operations, and a commitment to resilience, 
which are all traits of an HRO (Weick et al., 2008). It can also be concluded that TFS 
leaders had a passion for their jobs that superseded the physical needs of rest and time 
off, and included personal sacrifices during the 2011 wildfire season. This sense of 
purpose the TFS leaders expressed is an element associated with learning organizations 
(Senge, 2006). This sense of purpose is admirable among TFS leaders as it likens them 
more to a learning organization, however, it could also be a detriment to the organization 
if fatigue negatively affects decisions that TFS leaders make during a crisis. Because of 
the high risk of failure in an HRO, it is imperative that decisions are made with accuracy 
to avoid costly mistakes (Roberts et al., 1994).  
 Consideration of equipment resources was another factor that influenced how 
TFS leaders made decisions in 2011. Equipment resources were not unlimited, and TFS 
leaders were required to make difficult decisions regarding where and how to use certain 
equipment such as bulldozers, tankers, and aircraft. They had to decide how long to keep 
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that equipment in an area before moving it elsewhere. Situations like this required TFS 
leaders to make complex, high stakes decisions while allocating equipment during 2011, 
which was consistent with primary tenants of Macrocognition (Klein et al., 2003). An 
example the findings illustrated, regarding the use of a DC-10 aircraft, was a high risk 
situation with a time pressure component where multiple goals conflicted and where 
conditions of the DC-10’s use could not always be controlled or manipulated by TFS 
leaders. By seeking to further understand how difficult decisions like this were handled 
in 2011, TFS leaders can better perform their jobs in future situations where similar 
decisions must be made. After all, the Macrocognition /NDM paradigm exists to 
understand “how people handle difficult cognitive demands of their work, and trying to 
help them do a better job” (Schraagen et al., 2008, p. 6). 
 The findings indicated that TFS leaders showed a strong sense of respect for 
fiscal responsibility to the people of Texas and elected officials as they were expressly 
open about their fiscal decisions both to elected officials and the people of Texas. 
However, TFS leaders balanced this fiscal responsibility with their mandate to protect 
the people of Texas from wildfires. Even though the TFS went over their budget in 2011, 
they were justified in doing so, and they communicated willingly with the public of 
Texas.  
 The NDM paradigm posited eight characteristics that influence decision making. 
Perhaps a ninth characteristic should be allocation of limited resources. The findings 
from this study advocated that resource allocation was a constant factor that influenced 
decision making. While arguments could be made to place allocation of limited 
   
 
62 
 
resources into one of the other characteristics such as “high stakes” or “organizational 
goals and norms” (Zsambok & Klein, 1997, p. 5), this study revealed that resource 
allocation did not directly fit into either one of those categories. Therefore, based on the 
findings from this study, I suggest that a ninth characteristic, allocation of limited 
resources, be added to the NDM paradigm. 
Lessons Learned 
 It can be concluded from the findings that TFS leaders learned valuable lessons 
from decisions they made during the 2011 wildfire season. Learning lessons that result 
from crises is a trait of effective crisis leadership (James & Wooten, 2005). TFS leaders 
have a learning mentality, which is a key component for their organization to learn 
(James & Wooten, 2005; Hutchins & Wang, 2008). From these lessons learned, TFS 
leaders made changes and created new systems to operate more effectively. The creation 
of these new systems based on lessons learned aligns with Senge’s (2006) suggestion of 
how systems thinking operates among individuals and organizations. TFS leaders 
perceived these lessons learned as windows of opportunity to improve the strength of 
their decision making in the future, which is similar to how an HRO learns from failures 
or near failures (Weick et al., 2008).  
One of the lessons learned TFS leaders discussed was that they would 
communicate differently with interagency IMTs in the future, and ensure each IMT 
participates in an in-brief and de-brief. This lesson learned is supported by Boin and 
Hart’s (2003) suggestion of post-crisis learning in an organization as the TFS leaders 
made “technological improvements” and adapted their “bureaucratic routines” (p. 548). 
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By participating in proper in-briefs and de-briefs prior to dealing with a wildfire, 
interagency IMTs learn how to interact with the stakeholders and landowners whose 
property is affected by a wildfire. These in-briefs and de-briefs for interagency IMTs can 
help prevent miscommunication between the stakeholders and interagency IMTs who 
report to the TFS. By reducing instances of miscommunication in a crisis, the TFS can 
reduce the reputational damage it experiences during a crisis due to miscommunication 
(Coombs, 2007b).  
 It can be concluded from the findings that TFS leaders were involved in creating 
new systems and networks that allowed for more effective communication among the 
TFS, firefighters (TFS and non-TFS), and the public in Texas (media, landowners, and 
elected officials) during a wildfire. These new systems provided a better response 
strategy for the TFS to communicate with the public during a crisis. According to 
Coombs (2007b), effectively communicating with the public is a key element during a 
crisis situation.  
 TFS leaders also learned how to better communicate with their employees during 
a crisis situation. The findings showed that some TFS leaders felt they should have 
communicated more frequently and openly with their subordinates about decisions they 
were making. This conclusion supports the trust factor outlined by James and Wooten 
(2005) of effective crisis leadership.  
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Recommendations for Practice 
 I have several recommendations for TFS leaders to consider based on the 
conclusions of this study. Additionally, these recommendations were also considered in 
light of previous research that related to the findings from this study. 
 As discussed in the conclusions, consideration of safety was a priority TFS 
leaders discussed as a factor that influenced decisions they made in 2011. The literature 
agreed that safety should be a high priority for an organization dealing with a crisis 
situation (Bourrier, 1996; Coombs, 2007a). Therefore, it is recommended that TFS 
leaders should continue to prioritize and strive to improve their safe practices and 
procedures within the TFS during crisis situations in order to maintain their exemplary 
safety standards.  
One way TFS leaders could do this is by allowing independent auditors (similar 
to the federal aviation experts participant 6 discussed) to regularly inspect their 
operations during future wildfire or crisis situations. By allowing these auditors to 
regularly inspect their operations, TFS leaders can ensure they continually update and 
maintain safe practices when dealing with a crisis. 
 Kotter (2012) posited that leaders who are involved in learning organizations 
engage in lifelong learning. A key component of lifelong learning is taking risks and 
learning from the consequences associated with them, which TFS leaders did during the 
2011 wildfire season. Kotter (2012) suggested that leaders should reflect on their 
experiences in order to learn from them and improve their performance in the future. 
TFS leaders engaged in naturalistic decision making during the 2011 wildfire season 
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using their prior knowledge and experience. It is recommended that TFS leaders 
regularly reflect on decisions they make when dealing with wildfire and crises, so they 
can learn how to become even more effective when making decisions in future crisis 
situations. A suggestion for TFS leaders to reflect would be to honestly assess successful 
and unsuccessful (especially these) decisions they made during a crisis and factors that 
led them to those decisions. During future crisis situations, TFS leaders should allot time 
at the end of their day (or week depending on how long the crisis lasts) to think about 
and write down their thoughts about decisions they made. They should ask themselves 
questions such as: What decision(s) did I make that had a positive impact on the crisis 
situation? What decision(s) did I make that I would go back and alter or change 
completely? Did I allow other qualified individuals to question my decision(s) to ensure 
I was making the best possible one? After asking themselves these questions, TFS 
leaders should write down their answers and discuss their answers with their peers. This 
will not only allow leaders to assess themselves on the decisions they made, but it will 
also result in another form of accountability for them. 
 TFS leaders referenced having a deep sense of purpose for their roles during the 
2011 wildfire season. This sense of purpose led to TFS leaders making personal 
sacrifices and coping with exhaustion in order to perform their duties during critical 
times in the 2011 wildfire season. Quarantelli (1988) described situations like this as 
personnel burnout where “key officials in positions of authority continue working too 
long” (p. 380). While I understand that the 2011 wildfire season had unprecedented and 
previously unknown complications TFS leaders had to deal with, it is recommended that 
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TFS leaders consider taking time off to rest periodically during future wildfire or crisis 
situations to prevent personnel burnout. A recommendation for time off would be for 
every 21 days TFS leaders work, they should take four days off to rest. This would allow 
them enough time to rest, reflect, and reset before entering back into the crisis situation. 
Quarantelli (1988) further described possible implications of burnout including 
inefficient decision making. TFS leaders could provide a greater benefit to the 
organization and the public whom they serve by resting in order to make more effective 
decisions rather than making critical decisions when they are fatigued. By taking time 
off, TFS leaders have the opportunity to make more effective and efficient decisions for 
a longer period of time rather than if they work until they are burned out from 
exhaustion. 
 With regards to communication, I recommend that TFS leaders continue to learn 
and adapt new ways to best share information with the public during a crisis to avoid 
miscommunication. The TFS should continue to develop or encourage the development 
of networks that allow the TFS to efficiently disseminate information to the public 
during a wildfire or crisis. As the findings indicated, miscommunication negatively 
influenced the perceptions of Texas landowners towards the TFS according to the 
participants of this study. Similar to the Land Owner Liaison Team, TFS leaders could 
establish more communication networks between the TFS and organizations like the 
Texas Farm Bureau, Texas Cotton Association, the Texas Wheat Producers Association, 
the Texas Pecan Growers Association, the Texas Wildlife Association, and the 
Lumbermen’s Association of Texas and Louisiana, who are connected to landowners 
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and stakeholders in Texas. These networks could aid in a crisis by effectively 
disseminating information to Texas landowners and stakeholders. Additionally, more 
networks like the Land Owner Liaison Team could lessen instances of 
miscommunication between wildfire/crisis respondents (both TFS and non-TFS) and 
Texas stakeholders and landowners.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
 Through this study, I identified several opportunities for future research. The 
scope of this study was narrow as it focused solely on seven TFS leaders’ perspectives of 
how they made decisions. While meaningful, there is still much to be learned about how 
decisions were made during the 2011 wildfire season.  
 A possibility for future research could focus on how decisions were made on the 
ground level by the firemen and women who fought the 2011 wildfires. A study like this 
could shed light on the factors that influenced decisions at the individual firefighter 
level, and how those factors are consistent or inconsistent with the decision making 
factors found in this study of TFS leaders. A ground-level study could also be considered 
through the NDM/Macrocognition paradigm, and further inform that line of inquiry. 
These firemen and women could be considered experts, which is a primary tenant for 
research using the NDM/Macrocognition paradigm (Schraagen, et al., 2008). There are 
several approaches one could take when conducting a future study of ground-level 
firefighters. One approach could be to perform a case study about how individuals in a 
specific non-TFS IMT made decisions when fighting wildfires in 2011. Data could 
include interviews with members of the IMT, photographs of the IMT members fighting 
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fires in 2011, along with data mined from videos they recorded while fighting the 
wildfires. Another approach one could take would be a qualitative comparative 
evaluation about how men and women firefighters made decisions. This type of study 
could address the question (among others): What values did men and women firefighters 
consider when making decisions of what homes and properties to save while fighting 
fires in 2011? 
 The findings from this study showed how the TFS leaders operated like members 
of an HRO as they displayed characteristics of a HRO during the 2011 wildfire season. 
Specifically, they displayed a preoccupation with failure through their aviation safety 
protocols. They were not willing to allow even one accident to occur, and they focused 
on ways to mitigate the chances of an accident occurring. TFS leaders also showed 
sensitivity to operations during the wildfire season, as they had to integrate information 
from a number of different sources (including firefighters, private landowners, elected 
officials, and media) and follow a cognitive map of that information, which allowed 
them to make decisions. Additionally TFS leaders displayed a commitment to resilience, 
as they had to address a number of unexpected, time-sensitive situations such as 
determining how many and what kind of resources were needed to fight fires before they 
grew too big to fight. The TFS displayed an underspecification of structures when TFS 
leaders delegated decision making responsibilities to lower-level employees and 
firefighters, who had a better grasp of what was happening on the ground where the fires 
were burning. They did not micromanage the firefighters; rather, they gave the actual 
firefighting responsibilities to the IMTs. One characteristic of an HRO that the findings 
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from this study did not adequately support was a reluctance to simplify interpretations. A 
ground-level, qualitative study could address how TFS firefighters did or did not 
simplify complex information in order to make quick decisions when fighting fires. A 
future study like this could gather data by directly observing firefighters as they fight fire 
in addition to conducting interviews with them after the wildfire to understand how they 
dealt with uncertainty and processed information when dealing with the fire. 
 Further research should also be conducted about how Texas landowners perceive 
the new communication network TFS leaders initiated to improve communication 
between the TFS (and other firefighting agencies) and Texas landowners during a crisis. 
Additionally, a future study could address any concerns that Texas landowners have with 
the new communication network, and provide insight into how Texas landowners feel 
the new system could be improved or altered.   
  Further research should also be conducted regarding the leadership styles of the 
TFS leaders. Specifically, the research should consider how the leaders’ individual styles 
influence the role they fill on the leadership team and as leaders of their own teams 
respectively. A study like this could be a valuable source of information to TFS leaders 
and the TFS organization as a whole. The information may provide valuable insight for 
the continuity of the TFS organization, as they would have a reference for the type of 
leadership styles that work well within their organization. This should lead to more 
effective crisis management, as multiple studies have found that strong leadership (i.e. 
leaders who are willing to learn and who view crises as opportunities rather than 
problems) is vital to dealing with crises because of their dynamic and constantly 
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changing environments (Boin & Hart, 2003; James & Wooten, 2005; Walsh, 1995; 
Weick, 1988; Wooten & James, 2008). 
Conclusions 
 The purpose of this study was to describe how TFS leaders made decisions 
during the 2011 wildfire season. From the collection of participant experiences through 
interviews, documents, and artifacts, I was able to describe factors that influenced how 
TFS leaders made decisions. Based on the results, I drew conclusions and offered 
recommendations for future research and improvement to the TFS organization. I made a 
recommendation, based on the findings of this study, to add a ninth characteristic to the 
NDM paradigm, which should further explain how decisions are made during crisis 
situations. I hope that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations drawn from this 
study are informative to TFS leaders and to anyone who wants to better understand how 
leaders make decisions during a crisis.  
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APPENDIX 
Interview Protocol: 
Context 
1. Recall the 2011 wildfire season. Describe your role and responsibilities in this 
particular time. 
Incidents (decisions) 
2. Describe 3-5 separate incidents/decisions you either had to make or were involved in 
that dealt with specific incidents from the wildfires that year. 
3. What factors did you consider when each of those decisions were made? 
4. After each of those decisions were made, what actions were taken? 
Consequences 
5. What were the outcomes of each of those decisions? 
6. Why do you think each of those decisions were effective or ineffective? 
7. If you were faced with a similar situation(s) in the future, what decisions or actions 
would you do differently? 
 
 
